In the early hours of Friday morning, Israel launched a radical military campaign against Iran. The current operation, which would have been planned to take place over several days, aims at a list of nuclear and military installations, as well as senior regime officials, which develop on time. Iran has hitherto retaliated with drones and a substantial missile dam which could see Israel extend its targeting.
In a region that has seen endless blood effusions since Hamas’s October 2023 attacks, the sinister reality is that things can get worse before they get worse.
Under the Islamic Republic which took power in 1979, enmity towards Israel was a fundamental ideological principle of Iranian foreign policy and a key engine of its regional policy. Over the decades, their rivalry took place mainly through indirect actions of Iran and by secret operations of Israel.
This dynamic changed last year. In April and again in October, the two parties engaged in direct hostilities, Iran, twice launching massive missile salvas largely pushed by the Israeli and allied air defenses. After the second strike, which came shortly after Israel seriously degraded the upper ranks of Hezbollah in Lebanon – the most powerful Iranian attorney – the Iranels have targeted the Iranian air defenses and the facilities for the production of missiles, faced with little resistance or response.
But while the regional power projection of Iran decreased and its arsenal of missiles and drones proved to be largely ineffective, a third concern – a nuclear threat that Israel considered the existential – was still growing. Tehran had constantly extended the scale and the scope of his nuclear activity since President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iranian nuclear agreement during his first mandate; The administration of President Joe Biden asked and did not revive. In March, Trump announced that he had contacted Iran management to negotiate a new agreement, and his administration led five series of talks in Muscat and Rome to try to reach one.
For Iran, which has requested sanctions for the relief of its economy in difficulty, the success of negotiations with the United States is made up of concessions for which it has been opposed for a long time: completely dismantling its nuclear program or even ceasing the domestic enrichment of uranium. For Israel, eliminating, rather than simply restricting, the production of fissile materials that could be used to feed a weapon has been essential. For President Trump, the prospect of a military strike in Israel seems to be a means of strengthening Washington’s hand in a diplomatic agreement in which he is still interested.
But for the moment, the question can be less a question of whether diplomacy can succeed that the seriousness of the situation could degenerate. The worst scenarios are disastrous: a cycle of Israeli and Iranian counterparts that attract the United States, the Iranian non-state allies and the regional states, cause serious damage to civilians on all sides and injected a deep uncertainty into the world markets. Over time, the Iranian regime could try to reconstruct its nuclear activity of the rubble, only with an explicit objective of shaping a weapon as soon as possible as a means of deterrence in the future. Another disastrous scenario is that the regime in Tehran falls and there is an prolonged war for power and chaos or an even more difficult line regime armed with nuclear weapons.
Is there a path outside this in-depth crisis? Maybe, but not particularly promising. Trump’s declared objective – even when the fire is exchanged in two directions – concerns an agreement with Iran, and Tehran could offer concessions on the stipulation that it also implies an immediate cessation of hostilities with Israel. If Iran conceded on its red lines in order to contest a greater destruction, perhaps Trump would be lively enough to avoid an extended conflagration to also put Israel to end the climbing cycle.
The Iranian government previously demonstrated that in the face of particularly poorly favorable circumstances, in particular those which could threaten the very foundations of the regime itself, it can make concessions necessary for its survival. But faced with the most serious crisis that he has been confronted since the eight -year war with Iraq in the 1980s, he could eventually double the detriment of his people and the region.
